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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL JOAN STONE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
VAL FRANKLIN STONE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10698 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to modify the terms of a 
divorce decree and to award the custody of the four 
minor children to the father on the grounds that 
the mother is mentally incompetent and is otherwise 
unfit to care for them; and on the further grounds 
that the two oldest children, both over ten years 
of age, expressed a desire to live with their father. 
These proceedings also involve a motion pursuant 
to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
1 
have the mother of the mmor children submit to 
a mental examination before a disinterested psy-
chiatrist. (Tr. 13) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson found 
against the appellant on all issues. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
For the Supreme Court to reverse the decision 
1 
of the trial judge on all issues, and to award the ! 
custody of all four children to their father. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is one of first impression in the State 
of Utah and involves substantial rights of parents 
and minor children. It also brings before the court ' 
the issue of whether Anderson v. Anderson, 110 
Utah 300, 172 P. 2d 132 (1946), has been modified 
by Smith v. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, P. 2d 900 
( 1963) ; and if it has not, then this instant case 
seeks clarification of the Anderson case as it per- ! 
tains to children over ten years of age. 
The parties herein were divorced in a decree 
signed on July 21, 1964, by the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, the same judge who presided at the 
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trial in the lower court in the instant case. (Tr. 
5-6) At that time, the trial court awarded the care, 
custody, and control of the four minor children to 
the mother, the respondent herein. (Tr. 5) The 
children are all boys, and their names and ages at 
the time of the hearing in June of 1966 were as 
follows: Randall, born October 24, 1953, age 12; 
Richard, born March 13, 1955, age 11; Bret and 
Bart, born January 11, 1959, age 7. (Tr. 7). The 
father was ordered to pay $240.00 per month as 
alimony and child support (Tr. 8); and the record 
discloses that these payments were promptly made 
each and every rnon th. (Tr. 108) . In addition to 
these payments, the father spent time at the former 
residence assisting in taking care of the children 
when needed, and helping around the house and 
yard. (Tr. 108, 175). 
In April, 1965, the father remarried. His new 
wife Lynell had three children from a previous 
marriage, two girls and one boy. The ages for the 
two girls were 13 and 7 and the boy was 9 at the 
time of the proceedings in the instant case. (Tr. 
87-88). Their ages were about the same as the four 
minor children involved in this action, whose ages 
were 12, 11, and 7. 
The record shows that the respondent had a 
nervous breakdown during 1958-1960 and had not 
been able to take care of the children. (Tr. 118, 
Line 21 - Tr. 124; Tr. 131, Lines 9 et seq.). She 
had moved from her old neighborhood because she 
felt that the neighbol'S we1·e spying on her. (Tr. 119, 
Lines 8-18). After moving in to the new home, hel' 
condition worsened and she claimed that she had a 
tape recorder embedded into the back of her head 
which was recording what she was thinking, that 
her telephone had been tapped and people were spy-
ing on her; and that people were parked in cars 
watching her. (Tr. 120) In 1960 she went into the 
hospital for shock treatments (Tr. 120-121). The 
first of these did not help but after a little time she 
improved and by the time of the divorce in 1964 r 
was sufficiently better so the father decided not 
to contest the custody of the children. (Tr. 121). , 
Matters remained in this state until after the 
remarriage of the father in the summer of 1965 
when the old symptoms reappeared (Tr. 121, Lines 
12-15). The mother began complaining of headaches ' 
again and said she felt that people were spying 
on her. (Tr. 121, Lines 14-25). She thought the 
neighbors again were against her and she became 
very depressed. She told her husband that she 
thought she had a tape recorder in her head about 
the first part of 1966 which was some five or six 1 
months after the first symptoms appeared (Tr. 122, 
Lines 1-2). During this time she was unable to rec-
ognize her children. Her statements to her husband 
about this are as follows: 
"Q Did she ever tell you Mr. Stone that she 
did not recognize her children? 
A Yes sir. She has told me occasionally on 1 
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several occasions that she just no longer 
could recognize the children all the time. 
Q And when would these be, and what would 
be the circumstances? 
A Well, one time in particular was a Sat-
urday morning. I went out to pick up the 
children, and she just said, 'Well, you can 
take these children, but I don't think 
these little ones are mine.' She said the 
other day, 'I am sure they sent home the 
wrong children from school and I was 
just about to send them back and one 
of my neighbors convinced me that they 
were my children so I let them stay 
here.'" (Tr. 122, Lines 3-16.) 
One of the mother's neighbors who lived just across 
the street, and who had been in the mother's home 
several times testified that the mother told her that 
she didn't believe the younger twins were hers. This 
situation occurred in January of 1966, and as stated 
by the witness was as follows: 
"Q Has Mrs. Stone ever told you that she 
didn't believe that the two youngest 
children, the twins, were hers? 
A 
Q 
Yes, she did. 
And can you tell us about that situation, 
please? 
A Well, at the time she said she was very 
upset. I don't know what caused the situ-
ation to come about. 
Q When was this Mrs. Close? 
A This was about the 5th of January. 
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Q Of this year? 
A Of this year. 
Q All right, what happened then'! 
A I had been over visiting with Carol and l 
was just helping and visiting with her, 
and I left about 1 :30 that afternoon, the 
children, I don't know if they were home 
from school, or what the deal was, but I 
had to go home, and she had gone over 
to visit with another neighbor, and she 
was quite upset and the neighbor had 
called me over because I had been with 
Carol that day. 
Q Who was the neighbor, Mrs. Close? 
A Mrs. Lavon Marler. And the children 
were in primary and I really don't re-
member everything that happened except 
that she was worried about the twins. 
Q Who was worried about the twins? 
A Carol was worried about the twins. They 
were in primary, and she wanted to make 
sure they were there, and she was upset, 
and I said 'I will take you over', so I 
took her over to primary and got the 
twins and brought them out to my car, 
and she just didn't think they were her 
children. 
Q What did she say to you? 
A She asked me if I thought the twins were 
hers, and I said, 'Of course they are 
yours,' and I tried to reassure her t~at 
they were hers, and I told her the twms 
knew me, and that if they didn't know 
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me I was quite sure that they would not 
get into my car or come with me when I 
got them out. 
Q Did she say this in the presence of the 
two twins? 
A Yes, she did. (Tr. 153-155) 
This witness went on to testify that the mother 
told her that she felt that some of the people in the 
neighborhood were against her and that she thought 
there was a tape recorder set up in her house or a 
microphone and that the things she did and said 
were being recorded. (Tr. 156). None of this testi-
mony of either the father or the neighbors was de-
nied or controverted by the mother who did not take 
the stand nor offer any witnesses. 
The record discloses that the mother would 
just sit and stare and would become very depressed 
and moody. (Tr. 156-157) The mother stated to the 
father and to several neighbors that the two oldest 
boys were too much for her to handle; that she 
couldn't discipline them and that she felt that they 
should be living with their father (Tr. 126, 152-153; 
181-182) The neighbors became so concerned about 
the mother's depression and neglect in the home that 
they went to the mother's bishop and asked him 
to go to talk to her. (Tr. 157, 164, 180). Her illness 
persisted from the summer of 1965 to later than 
April, 1966. (Tr. 121, Lines 14-15; Tr. 183, 184) 
During this time, the mother was under the 
care of Jack L. Tedrow, M.D., with offices at 975 
7 
East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Dr. Tedrow 
was a physician and surgeon specializing in psychi-
atry, (Tr. 187). He stated that he had seen the 
mother continuously since her nervous breakdown 
in 1960 averaging several visits a year and that 
the last time he had seen her was on January 14, 
1966. (Tr. 199). Dr. Tedrow stated that he felt 
the mother was suffering from a mental illness 
known as schizophrenia (Tr. 191-192), and recom-
mended she be hospitalized in the LDS hospital psy-
chiatric ward for further examination. (Tr. 125-
126) The mother called the father and asked him 
if he would take the children while she went into 
the hospital to which he readily agreed. (Tr. 125-
126) 
The appellant testified that the mother's symp-
toms were the same from the summer of 1965 
through April of 1966, as those exhibited in 1960 
during her first nervous breakdown. He stated that 
he did not think that she was capable of taking care 
of the children or her house during these times. 
(Tr. 131) The father stated that just a few weeks 
prior to the time of the trial in June 1966, when he 
returned the children to their mother that her eyes 
were glassy and had kind of a fixed stare expres-
sion. He noticed that her hair had not been combed 
and that her body was shaking. She appeared to be 
extremely nervous (Tr. 130-131). He further stated 
that during the time shortly before and after these 
proceedings were commenced that the children were 
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neglected in the house, that the house was a mess, 
that food was spilled in the rooms, that the children 
were never clean, that he and his present wife 
had to bathe the children when they took them on 
Saturdays for visitation, and that they had to wash 
their clothes and feed them breakfast even though 
they were not picked up until about 9 :30 in the 
morning. (Tr. 118, 139). 
For some reason, the mother decided against 
going into the hospital. It was this decision that pre-
cipitated the present lawsuit which was commenced 
March 31, 1966. (Tr. 12-15) At the first hearing 
held on Friday, April 8, 1966, the mother's attorney 
stated that he was not ready to hear this matter 
and asked for a continuance. This was objected to 
by the father's counsel on the grounds that a hazard 
existed in the mother's home and that it would be 
detrimental to the children to allow them to remain 
in the home any longer while the mother was in her 
present mental state. The trial judge, JOSEPH G. 
JEPPSON, overruled this objection, continued the 
matter in all aspects and sent the case to pretrial. 
Judge Leonard W. Elton held the pretrial on 
May 5, 1966, and based upon the representation of 
the mother's counsel, that he could not be ready for 
trial before a certain date, the case was set for a two 
clay trial before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson 
beginning June 14, 1966. (Tr. 35). 
The pre-trial judge formulated the issues as 
follows: 
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" ( 1) Whether the plaintiff is mentally in-
competent to take care of the four minol' 
children. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Whether the plain tiff is otherwise unfit 
to take care of the four minor children. 
vVhether pursuant to Rule 35 of the : 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there is 
sufficient cause for the plaintiff to sub-
mit to psychiatric, physical examina-
tion. 
Should the court decide the plaintiff 
should be examined by a disinterested 
impartial physician the examining phy-
sician will be entitled to all medical re-
cords pertaining to the person being ex-
amined. Counsel for the plaintiff ob-
jects to the furnishing of all medical 
records, which objection was overruled. 
Whether the plaintiff is in contempt of 
the divorce decree heretofore entered in 
this matter for her failure to grant the 
defendant reasonable visitation rights 
with respect to the four children. 
After the issue of custody is decided 
then the trial court should decide the 
issue of what are reasonable visitation 
rights. (Tr. 36) 
* * * 
Whether the four minor children or any 
of them will select the defendant as the 
parent with whom they wish to reside 
permanently. 
If any child does so select the def end ant, 
whether that decision is binding on the 
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trial court as to which parent should 
have custody of that child (Tr. 38-39). 
The court then added five more issues for the plain-
tiff as follows: 
( 1) Whether the defendant is mentally in-
competent to take care of the four minor 
children. 
(2) Whether the defendant is otherwise un-
fit to take care of the four minor child-
ren. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Whether pursuant to Rule 35 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there is 
sufficient cause for the defendant to 
submit to psychiatric and physical ex-
amination. 
Whether or not the defendant has es-
tablished a suitable home with his new 
wife and whether his present wife is a 
suitable person to have these children. 
Whether the plaintiff's counsel is en-
titled to attorneys fees and the amount 
thereof in defense of this action. (Tr. 
37). 
The first four issues raised by the mother were de-
cided against her by her own stipulation in court. 
This stipulation was to the effect that the father 
and his present wife were capable in all respects to 
care for the minor children. This stipulation was 
made in open court and was recorded in the trial 
record as follows : 
"THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT HE 
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(plaintiff's counsel) HAS STIPULATED 
THAT BOTH HE (the defendant) AND HIS 
WIFE ARE FIT AND PROPER AND MOR-
AL PERSONS AND PROPER PERSONS 
TO RAISE THE CHILDREN." (Tr. 202 , 
Lines 20-22) ' 
This stipulation made it unnecessary to ca11 char-
acter witnesses who were present in court and ready 
to testify. (Tr. 202). 
At the trial, the defendant called the father, 
his present wife, four neighbors of the plaintiff, and 
the plaintiff's psychiatrist as a hostile witness. 
Character witnesses were present but were not 
needed because of the stipulation cited above. The 
father then rested. 
The mother did not take the stand, nor did she 
offer any witnesses in her behalf, nor did she offer 
any evidence to rebut the statements made by the 
father's witnesses as set forth above in this state-
ment off acts. 
The trial judge then ordered the children to be 
present the next day. That night the mother's at-
torney called the mother and the two oldest children 
into his office for a "brainwashing" session. What 
occurred at that meeting is described by the oldest 
boy Randall to the trial judge as follows: 
"Q You have never talked to your mother's 
attorney? 
A Yes. 
Q When did you talk to him? 
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A Yesterday night. 
Q What did you tell him? 
A Well, he talked to me about school and 
that. 
Q Did he tell you what to say down here? 
A Today? unh unh. 
Q Just tell me what you remember him 
telling you? 
A I remember him telling me that my mom-
my needs me and knowing that I should 
stay where I live. I guess that is what 
he said. And he said, 'I think that you 
will stay where you are.'" (Tr. 214-
215) 
In spite of this attempt, the two oldest boys told 
the trial judge they would rather live with their 
father than with their mother and gave their rea-
sons for so deciding. (Tr. 210, Lines 14-20; Tr. 212, 
Lines 12-14; Tr. 217, lines 1-13). 
The court then issued its memorandum decision 
finding against the father on all issues. (Tr. 46-47, 
51) Counsel for the mother then submitted his pro-
posed "Finding of Fact," Conclusions of Law, and a 
Decree (Tr. 54-59) to which written objections were 
filed on several grounds. (Tr. 60-63). The father 
also made an offer of proof that if the mother's psy-
chiatrist had been permitted to testify about the 
mother's mental condition, (The Doctor-patient pri-
vilege had been invoked by the mother and sustained 
by the trial judge) he would have said the mother 
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was mentally incompetent to take care of the four i 
minor children and that in his opinion the mother 
should be required to submit to further psychiatric 
examination and should be hospitalized for further 
treatment because of her condition. He would further 
testify that her condition was not good for the wel-
fare of the minor children and that it would have an 
adverse effect upon their said welfare (Tr. 62-63). 
A hearing was had on the said objections and motion 
after which the trial judge signed the Findings, 
Conclusions, and Decree and refused to allow the 
offer of proof. 
I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
CUSTODY OF THE TWO OLDEST BOYS TO THEIR 
FATHER, BECAUSE THESE BOYS WERE OVER THE 
AGE OF TEN YEARS AND BECAUSE THESE BOYS 
HAD STATED TO THEIR FATHER AND TO THE 
TRIAL JUDGE THAT THEY WANTED TO LIVE WITH 
THEIR FATHER. 
The trial judge stated in his memorandum 
decision as follows: 
" ( 4) The court is of the opinion that even 
though the two oldest children expressed a de-
sire to be with their father, that expression is 
not binding upon this court. This court is of 
the opinion that the case of Smith vs. Smith in 
15 Utah 2d does not apply to this case, and 
that the court is governed by the case of An-
derson v. Anderson found in 110 Utah." (Tr. 
46) 
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The oldest boy, Randall, age 12, made the 
following statement to the trial judge about who 
he wanted to live with and why: 
"Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Has your daddy ever asked you to come 
and live with him? 
Yes. 
And what did you tell him? 
I told him I wanted to. 
You told him that you wanted to go and 
live with him? 
Yes. 
Did he promise you anything when he 
asked you to come and live with him? 
No. 
He didn't promise you a bike, or a pony 
or fishing trips or anything? 
No." (Tr. 210) 
* * * 
"Q And what has your father ever said 
about your mother? 
A I haven't heard him say anything. 
Q He has never said anything about her. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I've never heard him. 
But you say that you would rather live 
with your father than your mother? 
Yes. 
Tell me why. 
Well, because I haven't seen my father 
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for so long and I want to see him." (Tr. 
212) 
This minor child, Randall, then went on to state 
that he knew his father's present wife's three child-
ren and wanted to have them as his brothers and 
sisters (Tr. 213) 
The trial judge's questions to the minor child 
Ricky, age 11, were as follows: 
"Q Do you want to spend more time with 
your father? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
How much more time? You tell me. 
Would you like to go and live with your 
father? 
Yes. 
Rather than your mother? And why? 
You've got to help me Ricky, you've got 
to tell me. Has your father ever told you 
that he would like to have you come and 
live with him? 
Yes. 
Have you told him that you would like 
to go live with him? 
Yes." (Tr. 217) 
This child also said that he would like to have the 
defendant's present wife's three children as his 
brothers and sisters. (Tr. 219) 
The record further discloses that these two 
oldest boys had also told their father shortly after 
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the proceedings had commenced that they wanted to 
come and live with him. The father's testimony in 
this regard and which is not disputed by the mother 
is as follows: 
"Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Have your children or any of them ever 
told you that they wanted to come and 
live with you and Lynell in the house. 
Yes sir, my two oldest sons have express-
ed that desire. 
Who are they? 
Randall Stone and Richard Stone. 
Can you tell us when it was that they ex-
pressed this desire and where it was and 
what was said? 
I was made aware of this whole situation 
the first part of this year when we ha~ 
two visits with the bishop, with Carol's 
bishop in our home. 
Let me ask you what the children said to 
you. 
The children? 
Yes. 
They said they would rather come up and 
live with me than where they are now 
living. 
When was this Mr. Stone? 
It has been in the last two months. 
In the last two months? 
Yes. 
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Q Did they say that to you prior to the time 
that the proceedings were started? 
A No sir, they didn't tell me before we start-
ed proceedings. 
Q Did you ever talk to the children and tell 
them how they should testify before the 
judge? 
A No sir, I haven't." (Tr. 116) 
On cross-examination the father clarified this con-
versation with his two oldest children. 
"Q (By Mr. Schaerrer) Now in regard to 
these children telling you that they want-
ed to come and live with you. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes sir. 
Your testimony was that they never told 
you that until you started these proceed-
ings, is that correct? 
Yes sir, that is correct. 
Didn't you go to them and tell them that 
they should make up their minds if they 
wanted to come and live with you. 
No sir, not until after the proceedings 
were started. 
But then you told them that? 
I asked the two older boys who they would 
like to live with. 
And did they tell you that? 
Did they tell me what? 
Did they tell me who they wanted to live 
with? 
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A Yes sir, they have. 
Q How much longer, how many. When you 
told them to make up their minds, how 
long did it take them to answer that 
question? 
A Randall, it took him from one week. 
Q And you were having several talks with 
him during this period of time? 
A No, sir; just from Saturday to Saturday 
is all. I told him not to make up his mind 
immediately because I knew it was a 
serious decision and that I would like 
him to make it, and if he possibly could 
to make a decision. 
Q And you told him you would like him to 
come and live with you? 
A I reminded him how much I did love him, 
and yes, I wanted him to come and live 
with me." (Tr. 143) 
These two oldest boys obviously felt the same way 
at the time of the trial some two months later. They 
both told the trial judge they wanted to spend more 
time with their father and wanted to come and live 
with him rather than their mother. The reason for 
this was that they did not get the opportunity to 
see their father enough. They both stated that they 
loved their father's present wife and would like to 
have her children as their brothers and sisters. Their 
testimony to the trial judge was that there were 
no lures held out to help them make this decision 
and it is obvious from the quotation above that this 
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decision represents their considered judgment. (Tr. 
210,212,213,217) 
In this regard, the defendant would like to 
point out that after the first day of the trial, the 
attorney for the mother called the two oldest boys 
into his office where together with their mother 
the two oldest boys were subjected to a brain wash-
ing session. (Tr. 214-215) This was shortly after the 
mother's attorney told the trial judge that he ob-
jected to the children being examined because he 
"didn't then think there was evidence enough 
to justify the traumatic experience this is 
going to be for the children to come into the 
courtroom here and elect one or the other par-
ent." (Tr. 207) 
Apparently he felt the session in his office was to 
be a therapeutic balm for the boys' emotional well 
being. Whatever virtuous motive might have precip-
itated this session, the appellant submits that it 
was improper and extremely unfair, and probably 
generated more anxiety in the boys than anything 
else could have done. 
Notwithstanding this eleventh hour session, the 
boys still told the trial judge the next day they 
wanted to live with their father rather than their 
mother and gave some very mature reasons for do-
mg so. 
The trial judge apparently ignored these re-
quests of the children and seems to had already made 
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up his mind that the mother was to have custody. 
This might have been because it was the same judge 
who had heard the earlier divorce decree in which 
he had granted the custody of the children to the 
mother. (Tr. 109, Lines 1-5) In addition to that 
fact, the father submits there are at least two other 
portions of the record that support his conclusion 
that the trial judge had erroneously made up his 
mind about the case before it ever got started. 
The first instance occurred during the court's 
opening remarks to counsel, as found on page 71 
of the transcript, as follows: 
"MR. McINTOSH: May I make an opening 
statement? 
THE COURT: No, let's get going. I have read 
all this. 
MR. McINTOSH: I would like to cite one case. 
THE COURT: Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah 
(2d). 
MR. McINTOSH: In addition there is the case 
of Holder vs. Holder in 
1959 Utah (This is a re-
porter's error, the case 
should be Bowler v. Bowler, 
96 N.W. 2d 129 (1959).) 
This, we think is on all 4's 
with this proceedings. 
THE COURT: You'd better read Anderson v. 
Anderson which has not been 
revised by the S11iith case." 
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Again at the end of the trial and when the court 
ordered the four minor children to be present for 
examination the next day, the attorney for the 
mother objected to this on the ground that it would 
be a traumatic experience for the children. The 
Court said, "I am going to permit them to come in, 
I have got my oiun idea of what the law is and then 
we can argue the law after." (Tr. 207) The ap-
pellant submits that it is obvious from the state-
ments of the trial judge that he felt the mother 
should get these children and that the consent of 
the children or their wishes and desires had no 
weight whatsoever. The trial judge obviously had 
his own idea of what the law should be and he 
wasn't going to let the children persuade him other-
wise. It's obvious that the only reason he gave the 
father the courtesy of talking to the children was be-
cause the father submitted thirty-four written ques-
tions for the trial judge to ask the children (Tr. 42-
45) After hearing these comments by the trial judge, 
it was no surprise to the father when the court stat-
ed in its memorandum decision that he believed the 
wishes and desires of the minor children were not 
controlling and that he felt that the Anderson v. 
Anderson case was binding. The defendant submits 
that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the 
Anderson holding and that paragraph 4 of his 
memorandum decision is contrary to law and to 
the decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court. 
Even assuming for the purpose of this argu-
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ment that the Ande?'Son case has not been modified 
by later decisions, the appellant submits that the 
trial judge has not properly interpreted the court's 
holding in Anderson insofar as the decisions and 
wishes of minor children over the age of ten years is 
concerned. The appellant further submits the An-
derson case is authority for his request for a change 
of custody. Anderson was a proceeding exactly like 
the instant case - that is, it was a request by the 
father to modify an earlier divorce decree and to 
award custody of a son to the father on the grounds 
that the son had reached ten years of age and had 
expressed a desire to be with the father. The court 
granted the father's motion for a change of cus-
tody, and although it held that the decision of the 
child was not absolutely binding upon the court, 
it went on to state: 
"In so holding, however, we do not mean that 
the choice of the child who has reached such 
an age and evidenced such intelligence as to 
appreciate the importance of his decision, 
should not be given due weight by the court 
in considering the question of change of cus-
tody. On the contrary, such choice, and the 
reasons, if any, advanced therefore, should be 
given careful consideration. If it be evident 
that the choice is not made because of some 
temporary dissatisfaction or a passing whim 
and is not dictated by some present lure, but 
is a considered judgment of the child, it may 
well be controlling in the determination of 
what is for the best interest of the child." 
23 
(Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300 305 
172p2d132 (1946) ). ' ' 
It is not suggested by the trial judge any-
where in his Memorandum Decision, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, or Decree that the choice 
of these two oldest boys was a mere whim or a pass-
ing fancy. As a matter of fact, the writer of this 
brief will represent to this court that the trial 
judge told him personally that their decision was 
not a mere whim or passing fancy. Moreover, the 
boys themselves told the trial judge that there was 
no "present lure" offered them in their decision; 
and the record discloses that the decision was their 
"considered judgment" and not anything else. The 
record overwhelmingly shows that the decision of 
these boys was made after mature deliberation and 
remained unchanged for two months notwithstand-
ing a "brain washing" session in the office of the 
respondent's attorney just before corning to court. 
Consequently, the appellant submits that it was pre-
judicial and reversible error for the trial judge to 
close his eyes to the request of these minor children 
under the circumstances of this case. The defendant 
further submits that the rationale of the Anderson 
case dictates that the custody of the two older chil-
dren should be awarded to the father 
Since Anderson was decided, the Supreme Court 
has had occasion to decide Sniith v. Smith, 15 Utah 
2d 36, 386 P 2d 900 ( 1963). In Smith the court 
held that a child who has reached the age of ten 
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years or more may select the parent to which he 
will attach himself and the court must grant cus-
tody of that child to that parent unless it is shown 
that the parent is unfit to have custody. 
It was stipulated by counsel for the mother; 
and the trial court expressly found that the father 
and his present wife were "fit, proper and moral 
persons and proper persons to raise the children." 
(Tr. 202) Consequently, the only issue before this 
court is whether the decision of the two oldest 
children is binding upon the court as held in Smith 
v. S11iith and as suggested in Anderson v. Anderson 
or whether it can be completely ignored as it was in 
the instant case. 
The appellant admits that the Smith holding 
dealt with an original divorce action; whereas the 
Anderson case involved a subsequent modification 
proceeding much like the instant case. However, 
the appellant respectfully submits that Anderson also 
held the decision of the child was to be controlling 
if it was a considered judgment rather than a mere 
whim or passing fancy. If the Court disagrees with 
this interpretation, then the father respectfully re-
quests the Court to interpret its holding in Ander-
son and hold that the desire of a child over the age 
of ten years is binding on the court in a modifica-
tion proceedings just as it is in an original divorce 
action or as a minimum alternative that it is bind-
ing under the circumstances in this case. 
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Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated - 1953 
reads as follows : 
"Disposition of property and children: When 
a decree of divorce is made the court may 
make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of 
the children and parties as may be equitable; 
provided that if any of the children obtain 
the age of 10 years and are of sound mind, 
such children shall have the privilege of select-
ing the parent to which they will attach them-
selves. Such subsequent changes or new orders 
may be made by the court with respect to the 
disposal of the children or the distribution 
of property as shall be reasonable and pro-
per." 
The father submits that there is nothing in the 
language cited above to show a legislative intent to 
allow a ten year old child the privilege to select his 
own parents in a divorce proceeding but deny him 
that right in a subsequent proceeding commenced 
to modify the earlier decree. The father submits 
there is no rationale to justify such a result and 
that it is unworkable in domestic relations cases. 
If a boy younger than ten needs a mother because of 
the tender, loving care and attention she can give; 
he needs it as much in the modification proceedings 
as in the original divorce. Similarily, if a boy older 
than ten needs a father becouse of the added disci-
pline problems and because of the need to prepare for 
education and business, doesn't it follow that he 
needs this same parent in the modification proceed-
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ings as much as he does in the original divorce 
action? Why should he be given the right to select 
the parent in the one case but not the other? The 
father submits that the legislature emphasized the 
age separation as being controlling and not the 
forum in which the action happens to be brought. 
The father submits that the age is controlling re-
gardless of when the action is commenced and that 
a more uniform result in this area can be achieved 
by holding that the desire of the youngster over 
ten years of age is controlling on the court in both 
the original divorce as held in Smith v. Smith as well 
as in a subsequent modification proceeding. 
The father submits the court should interpret 
Anderson v. Anderson to mean that a child over 
the age of ten has the absolute right to select the 
parent to which he will attach himself to and that 
this decision is binding upon the trial court in modi-
fication hearings the same as it has been held to be 
binding upon the trial court in divorce proceedings. 
As a minimum alternative, the defendant requests 
the court to hold that Anderson v. Anderson should 
be interpreted to award custody of the two oldest 
boys to their father under the circumstances of 
this case because their decision is obviously 
the result of mature deliberation and reflects 
their considered judgment and is not a pass-
ing fancy. It seems astonishing that this considered, 
deliberate judgment could be completely ignored 
by the trial judge. If their feeling was as strong as 
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it is expressed in the record herein, then it is very 
likely that these children are either going to run 
away from home to be with their father or else 
they are going to end up before the court in a future 
criminal proceedings. The request which the appel-
lant is making to this court is made in all fairness 
to avoid these situations in the future. 
In addition to the considered judgment of the 
oldest children, there is also the uncon troverted 
evidence by the father and by the mother's own 
neighbors that she was unable to take care of and 
adequately discipline the two oldest children. In this 
regard, the record shows that she told the witnesses 
that she was unable to take care of the two older 
boys and that she thought they would be better off 
with the appellant. (Tr. 126, 152, 153, 181, 182) 
The mother did not take the stand to rebut any of 
this testimony and the appellant submits that this 
evidence preponderates and dictates that the children 
are too much for the mother and they should be given 
to the father for that reason also. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THERE 
WAS NOT GOOD CAUSE SHOWN TO REQUIRE THE 
RESPONDENT TO SUBMIT TO A MENTAL EXAMINA-
TION PURSUANT TO RULE 35 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The pretrial judge listed one of the issues as 
follows: 
"3. Whether pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, there is sufficient 
cause for the plaintiff to submit to a psychi-
atric examination." (Tr. 36) 
The trial judge in his Memorandum Decision 
stated: 
"2. That there is not sufficient cause at this 
time to order the plaintiff to submit to a psy-
chiatric and physical examination. However, 
the plaintiff should be closely observed, and if 
it appears at some future time that a psychi-
atric and physical examination is necessary, 
application to the court shall be immediately 
made." (Tr. 46) 
The appellant submits the trial judge miscon-
ceived the burden required under Rule 35 and the 
apprehension he expressed about the mother's mental 
condition in his memorandum decision was suffi-
cient cause standing by itself to order the mother 
to submit to a mental examination to clear up any 
doubts about this issue and to determine just how 
serious the mother's mental illness really was. 
Rule 35 (a) states in part as follows: 
" (a) In an action in which the mental con-
dition of a party is in controversy he court in 
which the action is pending may order (her) 
to submit to a ... mental examination by a 
disinterested and imparial physician. The 
order may be made only upon motion for good 
cause shown and upon notice to the party to 
be examined and to all other parties and shall 
specify the time, place, matter, conditions, and 
scope of the examination and the person or 
persons by whom it is to be made." 
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The record shows that the mental competency 
of the mother was the key issue in this proceedings. 
(Tr. 13, 14, 36) The record also discloses that a 
motion was made for a mental examination pur-
suant to Rule 35 (Tr. 14) and that notice was given 
to the adverse party. (Tr. 15) The father agreed to 
pay all cost involved. He submits that he showed 
"good cause" for such an examination and that it 
was prejudicial error for the trial court to deny 
this examination. 
The requirement of "good cause" does not mean 
that the appellant must prove his case beyond a 
reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The mother in the instant case did not 
object to the pre-trial order. She did not take the 
stand nor did she offer any witnesses to show why 
she might be prejudiced by such an order. 
In 4 Moore's Federal Practice 2559, the author 
states: 
"An order for physical or mental examination 
(pursuant to rule 35 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure which is similar to Rule 35 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) may 
be made only for 'good cause shown.' How-
ever, it will usually be easy enough to make 
such a showing where the physical or mental 
condition of the party is actually in contro-
versy." 
In defining "good cause" in Rule 34 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure which is for the pro-
duction of documents, Professor Moore states: 
"The party seeking inspection is required to 
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show 'good cause thereof'. Considerations of 
practical convenience should play the leading 
role in determining what constitutes good 
cause. What is good cause depends upon the 
particular facts of each case. As Judge Mize 
said in one decision, 'It is difficult to lay down 
a definition of good cause and apply it to every 
particular case. There is a wide latitude.' Gen-
erally speaking, however, there should be a 
showing that the documents about to be in-
spected will in some way, aid the moving party 
in the preparation of his case; the the docu-
ments are relevant to the issue; that the mov-
ing party must establish his claim or defense 
by documents, most of which are in the ad-
verse party's possession; or the denial of pro-
duction would unduly prejudice the prepara-
tion of the party's case or would cause him 
hardship or injustice. That production at the 
trial would be cumbersome and time consum-
ing is a reason for ordering production and 
inspection under Rule 34." 4 Moore's Federal 
Practice, 2449 Section 34.08, "Showing of 
Good Cause." 
The appellant submits that all of the tests spe-
cified above for Rule 34 were met in the instant 
case. There was certainly a showing that the 
mother's mental condition was in controversy. In 
fact that was the key isue in this case. Her past 
history of mental illness, together with a reoccur-
ence of old symptoms which reappeared in the sum-
mer of 1965 and continued until this action was 
commenced about the first of April, 1966, all em-
phasize the fears which the father had for his chil-
dren. Just how serious the mother's mental condi-
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tion was could not be known by the father nor the 
neighbors he subpoenaed to court, nor by the trial 
judge. It was a matter for the experts - for some-
one who was qualified to probe the mind and ner-
vous systems and their relationship to the actions 
of the mother. 
The nature of this case precluded any direct evi-
dency by a qualified independent psychiatrist of the 
mother's mental condition because the mother claim-
ed the doctor-patient privilege. (Tr. 199) However, 
many lay witnesses including the father and the 
mother's neighbors did testify to unusual symptoms 
which the mother displayed as set forth above. The 
father submits that there is no way other than by an 
order pursuant to Rule 35 that the mother could be 
compelled to submit to a mental examination to see 
just how serious these symptoms were. 
The appellant subpoenaed the mother's psychi-
atrist as a hostile witness and did solicit an opinion 
suggesting that the respondent was suffering from a 
mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenia of a recur-
ring nature. (Tr. 191-192) This opinion was based 
on a hypothetical question which in turn was based 
on facts in evidence by the lay witnesses. However 
when the doctor was asked questions about his speci-
fic treatment of the mother, the doctor-patient pri-
vilege was invoked and no questions were allowed. 
(Tr. 199) The appellant submits that the mother's 
fear of not allowing the Doctor to testify; together 
with the fear that the mother displayed at pretrial 
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when her counsel objected to records of her past 
mental condition being made available to the appel-
lant, (Tr. 36 paragraph #4) is ample evidence of 
the respondent's mental sickness. If she was not 
apprehensive and if she thought that she was norm-
al and was able to take care of the children she 
should gladly have submitted to such an examina-
tion. The appellant testified the mother had told 
him she had been advised by Doctor Tedrow her 
psychiatrist to enter the LDS Hospital Psychiatric 
Ward for observation and treatment just before the 
present action was commenced. (Tr. 125. See also 
Tr. 28. These answers to the mother's interrogatories 
were made a part of the record as stated on Tr. 75, 
Lines 28-et. seq. and again at Tr. 128, Lines 17-
18) None of this evidence was denied by the mother, 
or any of the witnesses that were called by the 
father. 
The testimony of the lay witnesses put the 
mental illness and incompetency of the mother di-
rectly into issue. The appellant testified about the 
respondent's previous nervous breakdown and the re-
appearance of the symptoms again in the summer of 
1965 and that these symptoms continued until just 
a few weeks before the trial in June of 1966. (Tr. 
121) 
The respondent's neighbors living directly next 
door and across the street testified that the respon-
dent was mentally upset and depressed for a period 
of time from about September of 1965 through April 
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of 1966; although they did admit at the trial held 
on June 14, that at that time the mother was acting 
a little better. However they were unanimous in say-
ing that during the intervening months she was emo-
tionally upset, distressed, very depressed, that she 
could not recognize her children, that she stated that 
the oldest children were too hard for her to handle 
and that they should be with their father. They also 
stated that she told them that she thought that a 
tape recorder had been put in her house; that the 
neighbors were spying on her, that they did not like 
her, and that her telephone was being tapped. The 
neighbors became so concerned about this problem 
that they went to the mother's bishop and asked him 
to talk to her to see what could be done to straighten 
out the situation in the home. 
(Tr. 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 163, 164, 167, 
168, 169. See also Tr. 170 where the attorney 
for the mother more or less admits that the 
illness persisted from September of 1965 
through April of 1966. His questions always 
went to having the witnesses admit that she 
was a fairly good mother prior to the summer 
of 1965 and after the action was started in 
1966; and the appellant submits this clearly 
shows the mother's own attorney admitted her 
mental sickness during these intervening 
months. Other references to the neighbor's 
testimony are Tr. 178, 179, 180, 181, 182. 
See also 183 and 184 where the neighbor states 
that even when the mother began taking pills 
this year for what she believed was a low-
blood sugar condition that there did not seem 
to be much improvement at first, but that 
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during the last two months, which would have 
been May and June of 1966, there was a little 
improvement. In this regard, the testimony of 
the mother's psychiatrist on Transcript 187-
189 shows conclusively that the mother was 
suffering from mental illness and not a low-
blood sugar condition. Again on page 198 he 
states that the mother had all the symptoms 
of mental illness and the only symptom which 
would indicate low-blood sugar was the fa-
tigue.) 
The appellant submits that if this testimony is 
not sufficient to carry the burden required by Rule 
35 then it is impossible to ever use this rule for men-
tal examinations. The appellant wonders what more 
could possibly be required. He was willing to pay 
all costs of the examination and any other expenses 
which might be involved. 
The trial judge apparently felt the respondent 
should be closely watched and so stated in his mem-
orandum decision. This clearly shows that a doubt 
was raised in his mind as to the respondent's mental 
condition and the appellant submits that the court 
should have ordered the examination to clear up 
this doubt. The appellant does not believe the ap-
proach suggested by the trial judge would help. If 
the appellant did closely watch the respondent and 
found her condition got worse again and made ap-
plication to the court for relief, why should he ex-
pect any better treatment in the future than he 
received in the instant case which would mean that 
he would have to wait two to three months for dis-
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covery, trial schedules, etc. before the hearing. By 
that time the mother would be able to cover up her 
symptoms, could talk to her neighbors, and the 
father would be back where he is now. 
The trial judge refused to make any specific 
findings as to the testimony of the psychiatrist or 
the witnesses or the neighbors as to the mother's 
mental condition. His Memorandum Decision and 
"Findings of Fact" are mere conclusions of law. 
The appellant objected to them and made an offer 
of proof as to what the psychiatrist would say if he 
were permitted to testify as to his treatment of the 
mother. (Tr. 62) These objections and this offer 
were ignored. The appellant submits the trial court 
had ample evidence to determine that the mother 
was mentally ill and that she should be examined 
further. This would have brought forth a fresh, in-
dependent and impartial psychiatrist. Only by so 
doing could the trial judge be sure that the mother's 
mental condition was not going to be injurious to 
these minor children. The appellant stated in his 
testimony that when the mother had her nervous 
breakdown in 1960 she was not able to take care 
of the house or the minor children and that he was 
fearful that she could not do any better this time. 
(Tr. 178-124, 131, Lines 9 et. seq.) 
The appellant admits the testimony of some of 
the mother's neighbors who said on cross-examina-
tion that before the summer of 1965 and after April 
of 1966 the mother appeared to do better. But is this 
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sufficient? Is a lucid interval for a few months out of 
a year enough or is the job of raising four children 
a 24 hour a day task which requires rationality seven 
days a week as a minimum. Is a mother that can't 
even recognize her own children a good mother? Can 
one who sits and stares and is so depressed that she 
can't take care of her house or properly feed and 
clothe her children competent to have their custody? 
Suppose that a further mental examination dis-
closed a more serious mental illness than even Dr. 
Tedrow was able to diagnose from the hypothetical 
question. Wouldn't it be better to alleviate these 
doubts and to clear the air once and for all by a 
mental examination now. 
Other courts have faced this same problem and 
have even gone so far as to deny the mother not only 
custody of the children but visitation rights as well. 
In Bowler v. Bowler, 355 Michigan 686, 96 N.W. 
2d 129 (1959) the court had before it the father's 
motion to modify the original divorce decree and to 
grant the custody of the children to him on the 
grounds that the mother had become afflicted with 
a serious mental illness. The testimony of three psy-
chiatrists at the hearing was in favor of the father's 
position and based thereon the court upheld the 
change of custody and also denied the mother rea-
sonable visitation rights notwithstanding she had 
her friends and neighbors there to testify as to her 
good motherly qualities. In this connection the court 
said: 
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"The second ground, as we followed it is that 
the court erred in granting custody to the 
father where there was disputed medical tes-
timony. To thus badly state the question is 
to answer it. We are aware of no rule of law 
nor are we cited one, that ties the hands of 
a chancellor because of disputed medical testi-
mony. If we did know of any such rule, we 
would promptly write to overrule it. Opposed 
testimony of friends and former neighbors ap-
parently also depended upon by appellant, (as 
to their past observations as to the kindliness 
and maternal attributes and good character of 
Mrs. Bowler) however important in the usual 
case, were of but passing moment in the par-
ticular circumstances of this case. These at-
tributes were not disputed nor in issue and, if 
anything, only tend to make this case more 
pitiable. The raising of young children is a 
24 hour proposition, 7 days a week, year in 
and year out, and in these situations passing 
observations of lay witnesses made during the 
subjects' s lucid intervals (apparently one of 
the strange phenomenon of this grave mental 
sickness) may not challenge the clear, careful, 
and detached testinwny of three reputable psy-
chiatrists. The chancellor below himself made 
it plain that if it were not for the mother's 
mental state, he would gladly and without 
hesitation have restored her to actual as well 
as legal custody of the children." (Page 132 
of Court's Opinion. Emphasis added) 
In the Bowler case the psychiatrists stated that Mrs. 
Bowler was suffering "from a grave mental illness 
which they more or less uniformly diagnosed as schi-
zophrenia, paranoid type, chronic active." At least 
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two of them felt that she should be in a mental in-
stitution. One of the doctors told the court of the 
devastating effect that exposure of growing children 
to such an afflicted parent could have on the child-
ren not only in the present, but in the unpredictable 
future. Another testified that 'it is never in the best 
interests of anyone to be in the custody of somebody 
who is nientally ill;' and one medical witness who 
appears to have seen the mother most recently flatly 
recommended against granting the mother visita-
tion for her sake as well as the childrens. (Page 131 
of the opinion) 
The appellant submits that the Bowler casels 
on all 4's with the instant case. In the instant case 
the psychiatrist testified that the mother was suf-
fering from a mental illness diagnosed as schizo-
phrenia, and said that it was of a recurring or 
active nature. He stated that there were many dif-
ferent things that could happen around the house 
to trigger a schizophrenic episode such as emotional 
problems, responsibility of raising four children 
without the help of the father, etc. (Tr. 196) The 
testimony is undisputed that this doctor recom-
mended that the mother be hospitalized in the psy-
chiatric ward of the LDS hospital for further ex-
amination. (Tr. 125) The defendant submits that 
in addition to the schizophrenic tendancies mention-
ed by Dr. Tedrow that the mother's anxiety about 
being persecuted by her neighbors so much and that 
she felt a tape recorder was implanted in the back 
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of her head and in the house and that she had moved 
from a former residence and had also had her tele-
phone disconnected and the number changed be-
cause she thought that the neighbors were spying 
on her suggests a paranoid illness also. Under these 
circumstances, it might well be the opinion of a dis-
interested psychiatrist that not only should the cus-
tody of the children be taken from their mother 
and be given to their father but also that the mother 
should be deprived of ever exposing her mental ill-
ness to the children again; and forbidden from any 
future visitation rights in accordance with the opi-
nion set forth in the Bowler v. Bowler case. 
The appellant submits that this evidence amply 
discloses that "good cause" has been shown to re-
quire the respondent to submit to a mental exam-
ination. The appellant also suggests to the court that 
sufficient evidence has been shown upon which this 
court could make an outright change in the custody 
of the minor children based on the mental incompe-
tency of the mother without remanding this matter 
for a further examination or a new trial. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THA'T THE RE-
SPONDENT IS NOT MENTALLY INCOMPETENT TO 
TAKE CARE OF THE FOUR MINOR CHILDREN AND 
THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT OTHERWISE UN-
FIT TO TAKE CARE OF THEM IS CONTRARY TO 
THE OVERWHELMING WEI'GHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
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The trial judge stated in his memorandum 
decision as follows: 
"l. That the plaintiff is not mentally incom-
petent to take care of the minor children, nor 
is the plaintiff otherwise unfit to take care 
of them." (Tr. 46) 
The defendant submits there was ample uncon-
troverted evidence to sustain the finding that the 
mother was mentally incompetent and refers this 
court to the evidence cited above under the next 
preceding argument point. The appellant submits 
that the evidence he produced was not only suffi-
cient to carry the burden of good cause pursuant to 
Rule 35 for a further mental examination, but that 
it was also sufficient for the trial judge to make an 
outright award of the custody of the four minor 
children to the defendant. 
In addition to the respondent's mental incom-
petency, the appellant submits that there was also 
uncon troverted evidence of neglect of the physical 
well-being of the minor children; of a defeatist atti-
tude toward disciplining the two oldest boys; of afav-
ori tism towards the two youngest children ; as well 
as derogatory statements about the appellant made 
by the respondent and/or third parties in the re-
spondent's presence and also which were made in 
the presence of the minor children. These derog-
atory statements became very upsetting to the child-
ren as expressed by them in the record. All of these 
points were raised by the father in his motion for 
the change of custody of the children. (Tr. 13) 
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In the case of Harris v. Harris, 186 Cal. 2d 788, 
9 Cal Reporter, 300 ( 1960) the California Supreme 
Court stated: 
"In modifying a child custody award it was 
proper for the court to consider, besides the 
obvious condition of the household maintained 
by the mother, the family relations, financial 
condition of the parents, and the ages of the 
children, the whole background of the child-
ren and of the parents and any other factors 
bearing on the welfare of the children, such 
as the mother's lack of interest in them and 
her lack of devotion and concern for their 
welfare, neglect of, insufficient facilities and 
the inability to care for the children, hostility 
of the mother towards the father and her re-
fusal to allow him to express an interest in 
them, and her incapability of exercising neces-
sary discipline, supervision and control over 
the children, and her deliberate estrangement 
of them from their father, the home atmos-
phere and the available superior care of one 
parent and the educational needs of the child-
ren." 
The record discloses that the mother made der-
ogatory statements about the father and that none 
of this testimony was objected to or controverted 
by the mother. The appellant testified that imme-
diately before this proceeding was commenced he 
returned to the respondent's home with the minor 
children from a Saturday visitation session. At that 
time the mother exhibited hostility toward the father 
in the presence of the mmor children and jerked 
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them out of the car and told the father that he 
couldn't see them anymore on Wednesday which had 
been a visitation day for the past two years. The 
mother further stated that he might not be able to 
see them again on Saturday. (Tr. 109). 
That night, the mother asked her bishop's wife 
to her home where in the presence of the mother and 
the minor children, the bishop's wife made derog-
atory statements about the father and his present 
wife. The minor child Randall was so upset by this 
that he called his father the next day and stated 
to him what had occurred. The father's testimony in 
this regard is as follows: 
"Q Did they say anything later to you about 
that? 
A Yes sir, let me see, well the Saturday 
after this happened, my oldest son, Ran-
dall, he called me Sunday afternoon, and 
he said that after I brought them home 
the previous Saturday that his mother 
had called the bishop's wife and she came 
down and she was just telling them all 
kinds of bad things about myself and 
about Lynell. 
Q Is Randy your oldest son? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he say had been said? 
A He said that the bishop's wife had just 
called Lynell in so many - she said she 
was just a bad woman, and you see the 
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bishop's wife had never even met Lynell 
before previously. 
Q Did he say anything else had been said 
at that time? 
A He kind of inferred, she just said all 
kinds of bad things. 
Q Did he seem upset? 
A Yes, he was. He was extremely upset. 
Q What did you tell him? 
A I told him, 'Randall you are twelve years 
old, you are a big boy. You know some 
of these things that have been said.' I 
said, 'you know Lynell and you know 
what type of person she is.' I said, 'I 
can't be with you to explain to you too 
much about the situation, but you are 
going to have to just kind of make up 
your own mind as to what to believe and 
what you are not going to believe.' (Tr. 
110) 
When the trial judge asked Randall if his 
mother had ever said anything bad about his father, 
he replied in the affirmative stating: 
"Q (By the court) What does your mother 
ever tell you about your father? Does she 
ever talk about him? 
A (By Randall) She thinks he is a brat. 
Q Is that what she said he was? 
A She cusses at him. 
Q What does she say bad about your father? 
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A When Tommy and Bret were riding down 
the street on a bicycle, my mommy could-
n't find them, and she sat down and cried 
and started swearing at him. 
Q Swearing at whom? 
A My dad. 
Q Was this before they were separated? 
A After." (Tr. 211) 
Obviously this kind of talk is something that 
the minor children should not be subjected to. The 
mother's mental illness was exposed when she sat 
down and cried and swore at the father over a rela-
tively isimple matter. This episode obviously stuck 
in the boy's mind. The appellant submits the mother's 
open hostility is very upsetting to these children 
and that it is going to poison their minds not only 
to their father, but perhaps will give them an im-
proper prospective toward men in general and cer-
tainly toward the family as a unit. For these reasons 
the courts uniformly hold that the custody should 
be taken from the parent making the derogatory 
statements and be granted to the other. 32 ALR 
1005 "Alienation of Child's Affections as Affecting 
Custody A ward." 
In addition to the derogatory statements, the 
i-ecord shows that the respondent was not able to 
handle the oldest children and had admitted to neigh-
bors that they would probably be better off with 
their father and that they had also expressed a 
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desire to be with their father. (Tr. 126, 152, 181, 
182) This evidence was not denied by the mother. 
l\1oreover the evidence shows the mother favored 
the two younger twin boys (Tr. 127, 168) and this 
is another reason why the custody of at least the 
two older boys should be granted to the father. 
Finally the record shows that the mother 
neglected even giving the children the bare neces-
sities of life. The father testified that when he would 
pick the children up at 9 :30 on Saturdays for visita-
tion they were frequently unfed and were almost 
always in dirty clothes. (Tr. 79-80, 111, 118) Not 
only were their clothes dirty, but their bodies also 
and sometimes this dirt produced an awful stench. 
(Tr. 103, 118, 204) A friend of the father's wife 
testified that she was present at the father's house 
on several of the Saturday visitations and that the 
children "were very very dirty. Their clothes were 
dirty, their faces and hands were dirty and they 
looked terrible." She stated that the father and his 
present wife had to take the children in and to wash 
them and clean them before they would be ready for 
breakfast. (Tr. 204) 
None of this evidence was disputed by the 
mother. It is true that some of he neighbors stated 
on cross examination that at the time of the trial 
the mother was doing a better job of taking care of 
the children than she had done previously. However 
all of them admitted that while she had been "sick", 
"upset", and "depressed", (which was from the sum-
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mer of 1965 through April 1966) she had not been 
able to do the job of taking care of the children as 
they thought she should. In fact the neighbors became 
so alarmed that at one time a group of them went 
to the bishop to ask him to talk to the mother to see 
if there wasn't something that could be done in tak-
ing care of the children and cleaning up the house. 
(Tr. 152, 153, 156, 157, 157, 163, 164, 167, 168, 
169, 178-182) 
The appellant submits that all of the factors 
set forth in the Harris case, supra, are present in 
this case and that each of them dictate against the 
trial judge awarding the custody of the minor child-
ren to their mother. It was clear that the father's 
financial situation and home and environment was 
much better for the children than was the mothers. 
The mother stipuated that both the father and his 
present wife were fit persons in all repsects to have 
the custody of the children. (Tr. 202, Lines 20-22) 
The father had remarried and his present wife had 
three children about the same ages as the four that 
were involved in the instant case. Both he and his 
present wife were working and were thus able to 
financially take care of the seven children. All seven 
children would have been in school so it was not 
necessary for anybody to be home during the day 
to take care of them. However, the father's mother 
lives just a few houses away and could have come 
down in any emergency. On the other hand, the rec-
ord discloses that the mother was mentally ill, that 
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she was upset and depressed all the time and that the 
people in the neighborhood did not think that she 
was doing too good a job of taking care of the 
children. It is uncontroverted that the two oldest 
boys were becoming a discipline problem for her and 
that she stated that she thought they should be with 
their father. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COUR'T ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
FATHER SUCH LIMITED VISITATION RIGHTS AND 
IT ALSO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE MOTHER 
TO BE IN CONTEMPT FOR REFUSING TO AWARD 
THE FATHER REASONABLE VISITATION RIGHTS. 
In his memorandum decision the trial judge 
stated: 
"3. That the plaintiff is not in contempt of 
the decree of divorce heretofore entered for 
her failure to allow the defendant visitation 
rights which he had prior to the filing of the 
petition:" (Tr. 46) 
The trial court then amended his memorandum 
decision and added the following visitation rights: 
"It is ordered that the defendant is allowed 
to have the children Friday after school until 
Saturday night every other weekend, and s~all 
have the right to visit with them in addit10n 
thereto at times convenient to the children and 
the parties. Further the defendant may have 
the children with him for a period of at least 
two weeks during the summer when the ?e-
fendant has his vacation, and if the vacat10n 
is more than two weeks, he may have th~m 
with him during that period, during which 
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t~me the defendant will be relieved propor-
t10nately of the amount of support he is or-
dered to pay. However, this relief on the sup-
port only extends to summer vacation." (Tr. 
51) 
From the time of the divorce decree in July, 
1964, the parties had agreed that the father would 
take the children to his house every Wednesday 
night and also on Saturdays from about 9 :30 a.m. 
to 7 :30 p.m. (Tr. 107) This constituted reasonable 
visitation rights for the parties. Even then, the 
children stated to the trial judge that they would 
like to see their father more often in the future than 
they had in the past. (Tr. 210, 21 7) . However, the 
trial judge actually cut these visitation rights in 
half. There were no findings stated in the court's 
memorandum decision or "Findings of Fact" to sup-
port this action and the appellant submits that it is 
prejudicial error. 
The appellant had always paid his $240.00 per 
month alimony and child support right on time each 
and every month. (Tr. 108, Lines 1-11) He had also 
assisted his exwife in taking the children at times 
when she was unable to handle them and had helped 
out around the house and yard. (Tr. 108, 175) Yet, 
in spite of all this assistance and showing of good 
faith on the part of the father, the trial court actu-
ally penalized him and has taken the children away 
from him, notwithstanding their express desires to 
be with their father more and the two oldest children 
having stated that they wanted to come and live with 
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him. And this was done notwithstanding the stipula-
tion that the appellant and his present wife were fit 
and proper persons in all respects to have the cus-
tody of the children awarded to them. (Tr. 202) 
The appellant submits that the mother's action 
in ref using to let him see his children on W ednes-
days was merely a punishment for commencing this 
lawsuit and did not promote the welfare of the minor 
children in any way. It is undisputed that the par-
ties agreed to visitation every Wednesday night for 
two years and that the father had always taken the 
children on these occasions. Certainly this had be-
come reasonable visitation rights pursuant to the 
terms of the divorce decree. The record discloses that 
the mother was angry because the father was about to 
commence this action and that this anger prompted 
her actions denying the father Wednesday visitation 
rights. (Tr. 109) The mother did not offer any 
other reason for her action and the appellant sub-
mits that the trial judge should have found her in 
contempt of court for her failure to award the father 
reasonable visitation rights as ordered in the divorce 
decree, and as agreed upon by the parties for two 
years. 
v. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS MAT-
TER. 
Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure reads in part as follows: 
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"If the court renders judgment on the merits 
against the plaintiff the court shall make 
findings as provided in Rule 52 (a)." 
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure states in part as follows: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury, ... the court shall, unless the same are 
waived, find the facts specially and state sep-
arately its conclusions of law thereof and di-
rect the entry of the appropriate judgment; 
" 
There was no waiver of any kind of the Find-
ings of Fact in this matter, and the trial judge re-
fused to make any specific findings after the father 
requested them. After the proposed findings had 
been submitted by the mother's attorney, the father 
objected specifically to the findings and asked the 
court to make new findings concerning the welfare 
of the minor children pursuant to the evidence which 
had been produced. (Tr. 60-63) This the trial judge 
ref used to do. 
This court has held that in a divorce case where 
the case is tried to the court, there should be specific 
and direct findings of all of the facts. Doe v. Doe, 
48 Utah 200, 158 Pacific 781 (1916). All of the cases 
following Rule 52 in the Utah Code Annotated show 
that Conclusions of Law alone are not sufficient 
and that it is a reversible error for the court to 
enter judgment which is not based upon adequate 
findings of fact as to each and every material mat-
ter which is in issue. 
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The trial judge entered his memorandum deci-
sion on June 16, 1966. (Tr. 46-47) Based thereon, : 
counsel for the mother prepared some proposed i 
"Findings of Fact", "Conclusions of Law", and a 
"Decree" (Tr. 54-59). These were objected to by ' 
the appellant on several grounds but the court dis-
missed these objections and signed the findings on 
July 13, 1966. 
The appellant requests this honorable court to 
read these "findings." The appellant submits that 
they are merely a restatement of the conclusions 
of law which were stated by the court in its mem-
orandum decision and that the conclusions of law 
and decree are also simply a restatement of these 
same points. 
The appellant submits that the only proper find-
ing is contained in the first part of paragraph 4 
which states the children expressed a desire to be 
with their father (Tr. 55); but even then the court 
went on to overrule its own "findings" and award 
custody to the mother. 
If this court will read the "findings" it will 
find that there is not one specific fact found any-
where other than that the children have expressed 
a desire to be with their father. No testimony of any 
witnesses is referred to nor are any other parts 
of the evidence cited. There is nowhere any finding 
as to what is best for the welfare of the minor 
children. The appellant submits these "findings" 
52 
which are really conclusions are not supported by 
the evidence for the reasons set forth above in this 
brief, and that these "conclusions" are contrary to 
the law and to the evidence for the reasons set forth 
above. 
SUMMARY 
In summary the appellant submits the record 
in this case to this honorable court for study. The 
record shows that the appellant has been an excel-
lent father to the four minor children herein; that 
he has consistently each month paid the $240.00 
alimony and child support ordered by the court; that 
he has helped out on other circumstances and occa-
sions with the minor children and around the house; 
that he has remarried and that his present wife 
has three children of her own and their ages are 
about the same as the four children involved in the 
instant action; that both he and his present wife 
are fit and proper persons to have the custody of 
the minor children; that they are financially and are 
in all respects better able to take care of the four 
children than is the respondent; that the two oldest 
children have expressed a desire to live with their 
father rather than remain with their mother; that 
this decision is their considered judgment; that the 
mother has said that these two oldest children were 
too much for her to handle and that they should 
be with their father and that they have expressed 
their desire to be with the father - this she has 
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told to her neighbors as well as to other people; 
that the mother is suffering from a severe mental 
illness called schizophrenia of an active reoccurring 
nature and possibly a more serious illness; that for 
longer than six months she exhibited several symp-
toms of this mental illness; that she makes deroga-
tory statements about the father and the father's 
present wife to the said minor children; that she 
neglects to provide the said minor children with the 
necessities of life and that she has denied the father 
the right to see his children in the future as he 
has been seeing them in the past. Under these cir-
cumstances the appellant respectfully submits the 
trial judge erred and did not listen to the evidence 
and weigh it, but rather had his mind made up 
about the case to the prejudice of the father's rights, 
and certainly to the detriment of the minor children. 
The father submits that he is entitled to the 
custody of the four children as a matter of law 
from the record herein and further submits that 
the case should be remanded for the trial judge to 
make new findings and accurate conclusions of law 
granting custody of all four children to the appel-
lant for the reasons set forth above. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
54 
I acknowledge receipt of two copies of the 
Appellant's Brief this ---------------- day of November, 
1966. 
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